Richard Bauckham, Jens Schröter, and Paul Ricoeur on Memory and its Errors

Earlier this month I had the good fortune that my family vacation to Norway and England happened to coincide with the first day of the 2016 “Memory and the Reception of Jesus in Early Christianity” conference at St. Mary’s University in London. I thoroughly enjoyed the papers and even more so the opportunity to meet several people in person whom I had previously only ‘met’ virtually, i.e. in the scholarly blogosphere and facebooksphere.

While it would be unwise to put my memory to the test by attempting to summarize all the papers, I would like to flag up one issue that I found quite interesting, namely the fact that from their papers alone one could be left with the impression that there is a great chasm between Richard Bauckham and Jens Schröter with regard to the question of the functioning of memory and its propensity to error. To some extent, this is not surprising, since there are considerable differences between the two scholars on this point. Still, my memory of what Schröter had said in chapter 4 of From Jesus to the New Testament leads me to believe that the two scholars are perhaps a bit closer than what one might gather from their presentations. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile to provide an excerpt from this chapter.

Before doing so, however, let me add a few sentences on the papers themselves for those who were not at the conference.  In his paper on “The Psychology of Eyewitness Memory,” Richard Bauckham was concerned to distinguish between different types of memory and show that memory could be very reliable under certain conditions. By contrast, in his key note address “Memory, Theories of History, and the Reception of Jesus,” Jens Schröter was concerned to distinguish between appeals to individual memory as a way of getting back to Jesus and his own appeal to memory as a hermeneutical category that helps us to conceptualize the relationship between the past and the present and what we are doing when we represent the past in the present (regrettably, I think I’ve done a rather poor job clarifying the precise nature of this distinction, but hopefully I have been able to convey the basic point that Schröter wants to distinguish his own “memory approach” from a “memory approach” that appeals to individual memory as a way back to (the impact of) Jesus; for a much clearer treatment of this distinction between two different types of “memory approaches,” see Christine Jacobi‘s 2015 book Jesusüberlieferung bei Paulus? Analogien zwischen den echten Paulusbriefen und den synoptischen Evangelien, pp. 9-20; cf. here; for more on Schröter’s own perspective on historiography and memory, see here) . Within this context, Schröter was concerned to stress the fallibility of memory as a way of showing the problems with appealing to individual memory as a way of establishing a connection between Jesus and the Gospels (for example, along the lines of Richard Bauckham), since he was concerned to sideline this “memory approach,” with the goal of convincing his hearers to take up instead his own “memory approach,” which then he developed in the second part of his paper. For me, it was especially noteworthy that Schröter explicitly appealed to Johannes Fried when he was stressing the fallibility of memory in response to Bauckham’s line of argumentation, since in chapter 4 of From Jesus to the New Testament, Schröter had criticized Fried in a manner that suggests to me that Schröter’s understanding of the functioning of memory and its errors might be a bit closer to Bauckham than one might assume on the basis of their  papers at the St. Mary’s conference. With this in mind, let me now turn then to the key quotation, which is developed in relation to Paul Ricoeur and Johannes Fried. As usual, I will alternate between the English and the German.

II. Key Quotation (FJNT 58-59; VJNT 65-66):

Ricoeur then describes the work of the memory, which is related to the representation of the past and thus to history writing, in three steps: the documentary phase, the phase of explanation and understanding, and finally the phase of representation, thus the presentation in the historical narrative. Here, it is important to him that while “the historical representation is indeed a present picture of an absent thing,” the past things actually happened and “no one can make it that they did not happen.”

Die auf die Repräsentation der Vergangenheit, also die Geschichtsschreibung bezogene Arbeit des Gedächtnisses beschreibt Ricoeur sodann in drei Schritten: die dokumentarische Phase, die Phase des Erklärens und Verstehens sowie schließlich diejenige der Repräsentation, also der Darstellung in der historischen Erzählung. Dabei ist ihm wichtig, dass zwar “die geschichtliche Repräsentation ein gegenwärtiges Bild einer abwesenden Sache” ist, dass die vergangenen Dinge aber tatsächlich geschehen sind und “keiner machen kann, daß sie nicht gewesen sind”.

For a phenomenology of memory, it follows from this that Ricoeur warns against “approaching the memory from its deficiencies, indeed from its dysfunctions.” Ricoeur sees the validity of such a position in the fact that it pays attention to the problem of forgetting and the “deletion of traces.”

Für eine Phänomenologie des Gedächnis folgt daraus, dass Ricoeur davor warnt, “sich dem Gedächnis von seinen Insuffizienzen, ja seinen Fehlfunktionen her zu nähern.” Das Recht einer solcher Position sieht Ricoeur darin, dass sie auf das Problem des Vergessens und der “Auslöschung von Spuren” aufmerksam macht.

These problems, however, cannot be reduced to neurophysiological findings. Rather, it must first be considered that forgetting is a constitutive form of recollection, thus “before the abuse, there was the use, namely the necessarily selective character of the narrative.”

Allerdings lasse sich diese Problematik nicht auf einen neurophysiologischen Befund verkürzen. Vielmehr sei zunächst zu bedenken, dass Vergessen eine konstitutive Form der Erinnerung sei, also “vor dem Mißbrauch, nämlich der notwendig selektive Charakter der Erzählung” stehe.

In this Ricoeur’s approach differs fundamentally from that of Fried, who presented the memory as an entity that is deficient per se and ultimately applied the neurological findings in an arguably insufficiently differentiated manner to the epistemological and [66] science-of-history direction of questioning.

Damit ist Ricoeurs Zugang grundlegend von demjenigen Frieds unterschieden, der das Gedächtnis als eine per se fehlerhaft Instanz dargestellt und den neurologischen Befund letztlich wohl zu undifferenziert auf die epistemologische und geschichtswissenschaftliche Fragestellung übertragen hatte.

For Ricoeur, by contrast, forgetting does not simply represent a dysfunction of the memory that is to be corrected. Rather, forgetting, which is therein related to forgiving, can also have a salutary function for the appropriation of the past.

Für Ricoeur stellt sich das Vergessen dagegen nicht einfach als eine zu korrigierende Fehlfunktion des Gedächtnis dar. Vielmehr kann dem Vergessen, das darin dem Vergeben verwandt ist, auch eine für die Aneignung der Vergangenheit heilsame Funktion zukommen.

However, it may not be, as Ricoeur explicitly stresses, a “commanded forgetting.” Rather, a “salutary identity crisis” as a constituent part of the work of the memory is essential for the reappropriation of the past.

Allerdings darf es sich hierbei, wie Ricoeur ausdrücklich betont, nicht um ein “befohlenes Vergessen” handeln. Vielmehr sei für die Wiederaneignung der Vergangenheit eine “heilsame Identitätskrise” also Bestandteil der Errinnerungsarbeit erforderlich.

The strength of Ricoeur’s conception consists in the retention of the distinction between fiction and past reality. As much as he himself emphasizes the interweaving of the two spheres, he nevertheless always stresses their own respective modes of reference.

Die Stärke von Ricoeurs Entwurf besteht im Festhalten der Unterscheidung von Fiktion und vergangener Wirklichkeit. So sehr er selbst die Überschneidung beider Bereiche herausstellt, betont er jedoch stets ihren je eigenen Referenzmodus.

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Jens Schröter on Luke as an Ancient Historian and the Need for Differentiation in Assessing the Historical Value of Acts

Whereas my posts from January 13February 17, and March 17 dealt with Jens Schröter’s theoretical reflections on historiography, this post, like my posts from May 19 and August 25, will  focus more specifically on Jens Schröter’s perspectives on the historical value of Acts in From Jesus to the New Testament, which will presumably inform his forthcoming HNT commentary on Acts. Needless to say, I would be delighted if these posts, to which one more will be added, would initiate/provoke a more substantive response to Schröter’s treatment of this topic by one (or several) of the many Acts specialists in the blogging community!

As usual I will begin with the English translation so that the (selective) grammatical commentary directly follows the German text.

English Translation and German Version

From Jesus to the New Testament, p. 224: “If we evaluate these findings, then it can be said that the presentation of Luke moves within the framework of what was expected from an ancient historian. He possesses knowledge about the areas concerning which he reports; sometimes chronological inaccuracies slip in; and entirely in the sense of Lucian he has shaped his presentation and in this way drawn a picture of the development of Christianity in the first decades. … It has been shown further that one cannot adjudicate the historical value of Acts in general but only in detail. Luke possesses variously detailed information and local knowledge about different stages of the narrated history, which possibly provides a clue to his own background, perhaps even to his participation in the events.”

Von Jesus zum Neuen Testament, p. 244: Werten wir diesen Befund aus, so lässt sich formulieren, dass sich die Darstellung des Lukas im Rahmen des von einem antiken Historiker zu Erwartenden bewegt. Er besitzt Kenntnis über die Gegenden, von denen er berichtet, mitunter unterlaufen ihm chronologische Ungenauigkeiten, ganz im Sinne Lukians hat er seine Darstellung geformt und auf diese Weise ein Bild der Erwicklung des Christentums in den ersten Jahrzehnten gezeichnet.  … Es zeigt sich weiter, dass über den Geschichtswert der Apg nicht pauschal, sondern nur im Detail befunden werden kann. Lukas hat über die verschiedenen Etappen der erzählten Geschichte unterschiedlich detaillierte Informationen und Lokalkenntnisse, was möglicherweise einen Hinweis auf seine eigene Herkunft, vielleicht sogar auf seine Beteiligung an den Ereignissen, gibt.

Selective grammatical analysis

wertenaus (auswerten) = evaluate. I usually translate lässt sich + infinitive (here: formulieren) as “can be x-ed (here: formulated/stated/said). Since it is a subordinate clause introduced by dass, the verb bewegt moves to the end of the sentence. von einim antiken Historiker qualifies zu Erwartenden, which goes with des: “of the thing that is to be expected” / “of what was expected from”. mitunter = sometimes, occasionally, or every once in a while. Rather than using “slip in” unterlaufen ihm could also be translated as “slip by him” (unlike Wolter, I believe that Schröter explains the Quirinus census as an example of such a slip). I have translated im Sinne as “in the sense of”, but it might be preferable to write “in the vein of” or “along the lines of” (for the related phrase in diesem Sinne I think “in this vein”, adopted from Kathleen Ess, is a great solution). Es zeigt sich could be translated with “it becomes clear” or “it is shown”, but here I think a past tense is needed to capture the intended sense. It might be preferable to translate pauschal in a more precise manner as “across the board” or “in a sweeping manner”, but it seems to me that “in general” might convey the intended sense more clearly. befunden werden (befunden) seems to have the force of “decide”, “adjudge”, or “adjudicate”. Here, I have changed the passive verb to an active formulation for the sake of readability.

Substantive analysis

Let me develop my comments on the importance of this quotation by Jens Schröter by setting it in relation to a statement by Richard Bauckham. In his important book The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple (p. 27), Richard Bauckham writes: “I do not think that everything in John’s Gospel can be verified historically in these ways. As with any other source, what needs to be assessed is its general reliability. (This is the best reason why commentators are either consistently skeptical of historicity in John or consistently inclined to accept it.) If the Gospel is judged trustworthy so far as we can test it, then we should probably trust it for what we cannot verify. That is ordinary historical method.” Without wishing to affirm or reject this quotation in its entirety, today’s key quotation by Jens Schröter leads me to believe that Bauckham’s fundamental statement on “ordinary historical method” probably needs to be further nuanced, at least in relation to the question of the historicity of Acts. In particular, I think it needs to be stressed that our “testing” of the apparent relation between events and narrative in a given work might very well reveal that the author possesses “variously detailed information and local knowledge about different stages of the narrated history”, so that our conclusions about the “general reliability” of a given work may need to include the observation that the author appears to be more or less “reliable” in relation to various aspects of the narrative, i.e. in terms of precision, accuracy, or both. My point here is NOT that Richard Bauckham himself would necessarily disagree with this line of thought, but simply that it needs to be made explicit if his statement about ordinary historical method is not to be appropriated in unhelpful ways.